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Justin Lee Pedersen entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession 
of a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. He appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. 
Mr. Pedersen asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated because law enforcement officers 
conducted a search of his jacket1 without a warrant and in the absence of any valid 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Specifically, his rights under the Idaho 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated 
when his jacket was searched incident to his arrest. 
Prior to the search, Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and secured away from the 
jacket and, therefore, it was unreasonable to believe that he had access to the jacket or 
its contents. Accordingly, Mr. Pedersen asserts that the State failed to meet its burden 
of proving that the search of his jacket fell within an exception to the warrant 
requirement and the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to explain why the State's position that the district 
court correctly relied on State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000), is incorrect. 
1 The item of clothing was described as a grey, hooded, zip-up sweatshirt. (Tr., p.17, 
L.24 - p.18, L.1.) The district court and counsel consistently referred to the sweatshirt 
as a "jacket," thus all references contained herein will be to Mr. Pedersen's jacket. (See 
Tr., p.17, L.20, p.79, L.14.) 
1 
The statement of the and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Pedersen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Pedersen's Motion To Suppress 
Mr. Pedersen asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches 
protected by Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution was violated when officers conducted a warrantless search 
of his jacket. Because this was a warrantless search, the State bore the burden of 
proving that the search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. The only exception proffered by the State was the search incident to 
arrest exception; however, that exception is inapplicable based on the facts of this case 
the jacket was not within the area of "immediate control" of Mr. Pedersen as he 
was ten to fifteen feet away, the jacket was being sat on by Ms. Nucha, and 
Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and in the presence and control of Officer Jagosh. The 
scope of the area of "immediate control" under Chime/ is a radius that is to be 
objectively determined by the district court, based on the facts of each case. Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). Thus, officers searched Mr. Pedersen's jacket 
without a valid exception to the warrant requirement, where the jacket was not within the 
area of "immediate control" of Mr. Pedersen under Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763 (1969). 
Mr. Pedersen asserts that the search was an illegal search incident to arrest 
because the search was not justified by officer safety and Mr. Pedersen was being 
arrested on an outstanding warrant, for which no evidence of the arresting offense could 
be located within the jacket. As such, the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress. 
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State claims that the district court correctly concluded that "there was a to 
the officers" and a potential for the "concealment or destruction of evidence;" however, 
risk to the officers from the handcuffed and guarded Mr. Pedersen was essentially 
nonexistent: 
To determine whether a warrantless search incident to an arrest exceeded 
constitutional bounds, a court must ask: was the area in question, at the 
time it was searched, conceivably accessible to the arrestee-assuming 
that he was neither "an acrobat [nor] a Houdini"? 
United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). 
The jacket was not conceivably accessible to Mr. Pedersen, either to obtain a weapon 
or to conceal or destroy evidence. Accordingly, its search was not permissible under 
the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement. 
The search incident to arrest exception permits police to search an arrestee 
following a lawful custodial arrest and is premised upon the dual purposes of: (1) 
protecting the officer and other persons in the vicinity from any dangerous objects or 
weapons in the possession of the person arrested; and (2) preventing concealment or 
destruction of evidence within the reach of the arrestee. State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 
835, 838 (2004) (citing Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). Chime/limited 
the scope of the search to "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate 
control,'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chime/, 395 U.S. at 763. The 
Chime/ Court further elaborated on the justifications underlying the rule allowing 
contemporaneous searches through a discussion of the decision in Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40 (1968): 
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Peters involved a search that we upheld as incident to a proper arrest. We 
sustained the search, however, only because its scope had been 
"reasonably limited" by the "need to seize weapons" and "to prevent the 
destruction of evidence," to which Preston had referred. We emphasized 
that the arresting officer "did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough 
going examination of Peters and his personal effects. He seized him to cut 
short his flight, and he searched him primarily for weapons." 
Chime/, 395 U.S at 764 (1969) (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 67) (holding that the 
incident search was justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things which 
might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to 
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime"). 
In this case, Mr. Pedersen arrived at his house and spoke to Officer Jagosh. 
(Tr., p.42, Ls.16-25, p.44, Ls.4-21.) While Officer Jagosh ran his information, 
Mr. Pedersen emptied his pockets of valuables such as his wallet and cell phone and 
took off his jacket. (Tr., p.46, L.12- p.47, L.20.) He gave all of the items to Ms. Nucha, 
who was seated on a chair by the front door. (Tr., p.46, L.12 p.47, L.20, p.49, Ls.8-
11.) At some point she was sitting on all or part of the jacket. (Tr., p.66, Ls.16-19.) 
Officer Jagosh then placed Mr. Pedersen under arrest by putting him in handcuffs, after 
which he asked another officer to retrieve the jacket and other items from Ms. Nucho. 
(Tr., p.50, L.13- p.52, L.5, p.59, Ls.16-23.) Officer Jagosh testified that Mr. Pedersen 
was around 15 feet from Ms. Nucho when he handcuffed Mr. Pedersen. (Tr., p.50, L.22 
- p.51, L.1, p.59, Ls.11-15.) 
Officer Jagosh testified at the suppression hearing that Mr. Pedersen took off the 
jacket and handed the items to Ms. Nucho while he was running Mr. Pedersen's 
information through dispatch. (Tr., p.58, Ls.7-20.) The jacket was not retrieved and 
searched until after Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed. (Tr., p.51, Ls.15-20.) 
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The district court denied Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress, relying on the Idaho 
rt of Appeals' holding in State v. Bowman, 1 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000). 
In Bowman, the Court of Appeals upheld the search of Mr. Bowman's jacket 
incident to his arrest after he handed the jacket to a woman a few feet away 
immediately prior to his arrest !d. 134 Idaho at 180. The Bowman Court found the 
following facts determinative: there was one officer and three civilians, the arrestee had 
"hastily" removed his jacket and was left standing in a T-shirt at 4:30 a.m. in January, 
the distance from the arrestee to the woman holding the jacket was less than fifteen 
feet, and the arrestee had not yet been handcuffed. /d. (emphasis added). 
The State attempts to distinguish LaMay, while likening the facts of this case to 
those in Bowman; however, the State fails to understand that the critical difference that 
makes Bowman distinguishable from this case is the fact that in Mr. Pedersen's case he 
was handcuffed. Similarly, the defendant in LaMay was handcuffed. The defendant in 
Bowman was not handcuffed and thus there was a concern that he could lunge for an 
object. 
In denying Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress, the district court attempted to 
apply the test set forth in Bowman to the facts of this case, but it neglected to appreciate 
the original reason behind the pertinent warrant exception-to protect officer safety and 
to prevent removal or destruction of the evidence of the crime. Thus, the district court 
neglected to consider LaMay, an Idaho Supreme Court decision that also utilized the 
factors set forth in Bowman, but addressed a situation where the arrestee was 
handcuffed and under the control of an officer like Mr. Pedersen was in this case. In 
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failing to recognize LaMay, district court 
arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise restrained." 
the importance of "whether the 
140 Idaho at 839. 
The LaMay Court applied the Chime! standard and used the same factors used by 
the Court of Appeals in Bowman to determine what is reasonably within an arrestee's 
area of immediate control: (1) the distance between the arrestee and the place 
searched; (2) whether the arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise restrained; (3) whether 
police were positioned so as to block the arrestee from the area searched; (4) the ease 
of access to the area itself; and (5) the number of officers. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 839. In 
LaMay, the defendant had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a hallway under 
guard. ld. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the subsequent search of a backpack 
located fifteen feet away in another room was not justified as a search incident to his 
arrest merely because the backpack had been in his immediate control prior to his 
arrest. /d. The Court held that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the 
search of the backpack without a warrant. /d. 
Like the facts of LaMay, here the jacket had been in Mr. Pedersen's immediate 
control prior to his arrest, but like the defendant in LaMay, Mr. Pedersen was removed 
from the immediate vicinity and was also handcuffed and under the guard of law 
enforcement. Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and in the control of an officer, when his 
jacket was seized and searched, and such is determinative of whether he had 
immediate control of the jacket. There was no potential risk of harm to the officers 
present, as it was not possible for Mr. Pedersen to: (1) remove the handcuffs, then (2) 
sprint away from the officer standing next to him and over to the jacket, then (3) remove 
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it from under Ms. Nucha, and then (4) access a weapon in the against armed 
enforcement officers who had on the curtilage of his home. 
The district court, in applying the factors set forth in Bowman, appeared to place 
equal weight on each factor; however, the fact that Mr. Pedersen was restrained by 
handcuffs and under the guard of a law enforcement officer should have weighed 
heavily in favor of suppression. Yet nothing about the test used by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Bowman and the Idaho Supreme Court in LaMay notes that it is necessary 
or even recommended, that the district courts give equal weight to each factor. In fact, 
it makes no sense to do so, particularly where the test adopted by the Bowman Court 
was merely a list of factors that the courts have historically used in trying to answer the 
question of where it would be possible for the arrestee to reach. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH & SEIZURE S 6.3(c), at 306 (3d eel. 1996). As noted by the LaFave 
treatise-whether the arrestee was handcuffed "substantially narrows the area of 
control." /d. 
Mr. Pedersen would have had to be either "an acrobat" or "a Houdini" in order to 
escape the handcuffs and the officer guarding him, and dash 15 feet over to his 
roommate and then remove the jacket from under her and attempt to grab some sort of 
weapon or contraband. Thus, the district court's conclusion regarding fact number four, 
that there existed a "great ease of access to the area itself" was clearly erroneous. 
(Tr., p. 79, L.25- p.80, L.21.) 
Further, "a warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation."' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)). Therefore, after the officers secured their own 
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safety and restrained Mr. Pedersen, the justifications underlying incident to 
Mr. Pedersen was not an immediate threat to the officers as he was handcuffed, 
removed from the immediate location, and under the control of an officer. As such, the 
State failed to show that the jacket was within Mr. Pedersen's immediate control as 
required under Chime/ in order to justify the search under the search incident to arrest 
exception of the warrant requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pedersen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
judgment and commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and 
remand his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 2014. 
SALL Yd. COOLEY ,; 
DeputY State Appellate Public Defender 
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